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EDUCATION AND THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS:
ALTERNATIVES FOR SUSPENDED AND
EXPELLED STUDENTS
INTRODUCTION

In the last thirty years, state constitutions have become a well-recognized source of civil liberties as well as a source of greater protection for rights recognized concurrently by federal and state
constitutions.' State constitutions provide an alternative for plaintiffs
seeking to enforce civil rights that either have not been recognized or
have been narrowly interpreted by the federal judicial system. 2 In the
area of education, state constitutions may be the most important
source of protection for expelled and suspended students.
Every state constitution has an education clause.3 The highest
courts of many states have held that their state constitutions' education clauses afford individuals an enforceable right to education.4 In
some states, the highest courts have declared the right to education to
be fundamental and deserving of strict scrutiny analysis for equal protection purposes.5 In others, the right has been accorded a standard
of review that does not reach the level of strict scrutiny but is still
higher than a rational basis analysis. 6 Still other state courts have not
yet addressed the issue or have employed a mere rational basis standard of review. 7 Despite the fact that these education clauses exist
and incorporate enforceable rights, students are suspended and expelled from public school every year. 8 This Note argues that in states
recognizing a right to education, suspended and expelled students,
I ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 49 (1989) [hereinafter ADVISORY COMMISSION].
2

Id.

State judges from all sections of the country have reported significant
increases in litigation under state bills of rights. Scholars have identified
some 400 cases since 1970 in which state high courts have either granted
greater rights protection under their state constitutions than was granted by
the U.S. Supreme Court under the federal Constitution or have based their
decisions affirming rights solely on their state constitutions.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
3
Molly McUsic, The Use of Education Clauses in School Finance Reform Litigation, 28
HARV.J. ON LEGIS. 307, 311 (1991). See, e.g., AL%. CONSr. art. 14, § 256; MASS. CONST. pt. 2,
ch. 5, § 2, amend, art. XJV; N.H. CONST. art 83; OR. CONST. art. VIII, § 3; WASH. CONST.

art. IX, §§ 1-2.
4 See infra part II.B.
5
6
7

See infra part I1.B.2.
See infra notes- 133-35 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 136-43 and accompanying text.

8

See infra part IIIA.
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although afforded due process through suspension or expulsion hearings and other means, continue to possess a right to education, and
accordingly, that the state must provide them with some form of alternative education.9
Under some circumstances, suspension or expulsion may be a
completely reasonable means of dealing with problem students who
disrupt classrooms and make it difficult for others to learn. Failing to
provide these students with an educational alternative, however, not
only contributes to the growing problems of drug abuse, crime, and
increased utilization of public assistance,' 0 but also may be a deprivation of a state constitutional right. At least in states like California and
Pennsylvania, where the states' highest courts have held that their
state constitutions incorporate a fundamental right to education,"
courts should recognize that students continue to possess that enforceable right even after they have been suspended or expelled.
Under the strict scrutiny equal protection analysis, which courts apply
when fundamental rights are at stake, the imposition of suspension or
expulsion without an offer of alternative education is not narrowly tailored enough to the state's 'interest in maintaining peace in the
12
schools.
Part I of this Note defines suspension and expulsion and explores
the procedural requirements imposed by the courts under the federal
Constitution. It also describes some examples of alternative education
programs that have already been implemented by various states. Part
I then explains the lack of a federal fundamental right to education
and the possibility that education may nevertheless Warrant a higher
level of scrutiny than the rational basis test under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Part II briefly explains the authority of state courts to interpret
state constitutions more broadly than the federal courts have interpreted the federal Constitution. Part II then examines the education
clauses of state constitutions and how they have been interpreted by
the state courts.
Part III explores the policy arguments inherent in a claim for alternative education for suspended and expelled students. It then examines the possibility of stating a claim for alternative education
under both a constitutional education clause alone and under the
9 Various forms of alternative education already exist in many states. See infra part
I.B. For the purposes of this Note, "alternative education" does not encompass private
schools requiring the payment of tuition, because this alternative is only available to those
students whose parents have the financial resources to pay for their education.
'0
See infra part lIA.
11 See Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976); District of Wilkinsburg v. Wilkinsburg Educ. Ass'n, 667 A.2d 5 (Pa. 1995).
12
See infra part HI.C.
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equal protection test for fundamental rights, a strict scrutiny analysis.
Finally, it analyzes the possibility that, under equal protection, the disparate treatment of disabled and non-disabled students for purposes
of suspension and expulsion will not withstand strict scrutiny or even
an intermediate level of scrutiny.
I
BACKGROUND

A.

Suspension and Expulsion in the United States
1. Suspension and Expulsion Explained

Suspension and expulsion are similar punishments, both resulting in the removal of a student from school for some period of time.
The length of removal varies with the discipline imposed. Suspension
is the short-term removal of a student from school or "the denial of
participation in regular courses and activities."' 8 A long-term suspension is any suspension that lasts longer than ten days but less than the
"time between the start of the suspension and the end of the [school]
term."14 Expulsion, on the other hand, is the complete removal of a
student from school for an extended period of time, 15 usually for the
remainder of the school term. 16 Suspensions and expulsions are
17
treated in the same manner for due process purposes.
The types of misconduct punishable by suspension or expulsion
vary from school to school.' 8 Generally, state legislatures delegate the
power to institute rules and regulations in public schools to school
districts, which in turn delegate authority and responsibility to school
personnel.' 9 Therefore, most of the decisions enforcing rules and
regulations are made by teachers and principals. 20 Expulsion and suspension are two of the means by which school personnel enforce rules
and regulations. School authorities have the power to expel or suspend a student who disobeys a reasonable rule or regulation. 2 ' These
authorities are given great discretion under the expulsion and suspension rules not only to decide whether a student has violated a rule or
Philip T.K. Daniel & Karen Bond Coriell, Suspension and Expulsion in America'sPublic
'3
Schools: Has Unfairness Resulted from a Narrowingof Due Process', 13 HAMUNE J. PuB. L. &
POL'Y 1, 10-11 (1992).
14 LAWRENCE F. Rossow, THE LAW OF STUDENT EXPULSIONS AND SUSPENSIONS 3 (1989).
15 Daniel & Coriell, supra note 13, at 7.
16 Rossow, supra note 14, at 3.
17 Id.
18 See infra part IIIA.

19 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 14.30.045 (1994); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 35291 (West 1994);
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-32-109 (West 1994); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 71, §§ 37H,
37H1/2 (West 1994); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 167.161, 167.171 (Vernon 1993).
20 ANNE FLOWERS & EDWARD C. BoLMEiR,LAW AND PUPIL CONTROL § 1.1 (1964).
21

Id. § 1.4.
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regulation, but also to determine what sort of discipline should be
imposed. 22 Although certain procedural safeguards must be followed
for a suspension or expulsion to be valid,2 3 it should be clear that
school authorities may impose these forms of discipline for a wide va24
riety of rule violations.
2.

ConstitutionalProceduralRequirements for Suspensions and
Expulsions

Although suspension and expulsion are considered proper forms
of discipline and education is not considered a fundamental right
under the federal Constitution,2 5 the Supreme Court has held that
school districts must comply with important procedural safeguards
before suspending or expelling a student.
In Goss v. Lopez,2 6 the plaintiffs, nine high school students who
had been suspended from public school without a hearing, challenged an Ohio law that empowered public school principals to sus27
pend students for misconduct for up to ten days or to expel them.
Although the law provided for parental notification and an appeal of
the decision to the Board of Education by expelled students or their
parents, suspended students were afforded much fewer procedural
safeguards than expelled students.28 The Supreme Court upheld the
lower court's finding that the plaintiffs were denied due process by
not being afforded a hearing before their suspension or within a rea29
sonable time thereafter.
In.reaching its holding, the Court ruled that when a state decides
to provide public education, it must recognize that students have a
property interest in education protected by the Due Process Clause.30
Along with this property interest, the Court held that students have a
liberty interest in their standing with fellow students and teachers and
in their opportunity for higher education and employment. 3 1 Because the Due Process Clause protects these interests, a state may not
unilaterally decide that misconduct has occurred and suspend students without affording them procedural safeguards, such as a hear22
23
24

Id.
See infra part I.A.2.
See infra part HIA

25
26
27
28
29
30

See infra part I.C.
419 U.S. 565 (1975).

31

Id. at 574-75.

Id. at 567.

Id. at 567-68.
Id. at 572.
Id. at 574.
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ing.32 Therefore, the Court determined that short-term suspensions
require notice and an informal hearing. 33
The procedural requirements for long-term suspensions and expulsions have been established through a series of federal court decisions8 4 and are somewhat more rigorous than the requirements for
short-term suspensions. The student must be warned that certain
types of behavior can result in long-term suspension or expulsion, and
the student and his or her parent must be informed of specific
charges and grounds for expulsion. 5 These procedures satisfy the notice requirement. For expulsion, the hearing requirement is more
formal than that required for short-term suspensions. The hearing
must take place before the student is formally expelled, and most
states afford the student many of the same rights he or she would have
in a courtroom trial 3 6 Additionally, the charges against the student
must be supported by substantial evidence.3 7 However, as long as the
hearing is performed in good faith without a gross deprivation of
rights, courts will generally uphold the decision of school authorities.38 State law determines whether the student has the right to appeal the decision to expel. 39
Other decisions have accorded students further procedural protections. In Craig v. Selma City School Board,4° for example, a federal
district court held that a school district may violate substantive due
process when it prohibits suspended students or their representatives
from retrieving the students' books from school. 41 The court could
not find any legitimate governmental interest in depriving students of
their books. 4 2 Also, in Cook v. Edwards,43 another federal district court
32

Id. at 576.

Rossow, supranote 14, at 35 (pointing out that in practice, no time lapse actually
occurs between notice and the informal hearing because students are brought to the office
where they are informed that they are going to be suspended, and the hearing usually
begins immediately thereafter).
34 Id. at 3-33.
35
Id. at 4 (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968); Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.),
33

cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961)).

36 Id. at 7-8 (noting that most state statutes accord students and parents the right to
present witnesses, the right to testify, the right to an attorney, the right to cross-examine,
and the right to a copy of the record).
37 Id. at 21 (citing Birdsey v. Grand Blanc Community Sch., 344 N.W.2d 342 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1983)).
38 Id. at 8 (citing Greene v. Moore, 373 F. Supp. 1194 (N.D. Tex. 1974)).
39
40

Id. at 32.

41

Id. at 596.

42

Id.

4S

341 F. Supp. 307 (D.N.H. 1972).

801 F. Supp. 585 (S.D. Ala. 1992).
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held that a student may not be expelled for an indefinite period of
time.44
Clearly, schools must provide many procedural safeguards to lawfully suspend or expel a student. These safeguards do tend to dissipate the discretionary nature of such decisions. However, they do
nothing to ensure that students who are legitimately suspended or expelled receive an education. In states where the state constitution
confers a fundamental or at least enforceable right, suspended and
expelled students possess rights that may be protected to a greater
extent than under the federal Constitution. As the next Part demonstrates, alternative education programs are already in place in many
districts and would be a viable solution to this problem.
B.

Alternative Education

Alternative education programs are already operating in many
states. These programs increase students' belief in their academic
ability while decreasing disruptive behavior among students who have
demonstrated disciplinary problems. 45 These alternative schools may
be one answer to the problem of providing suspended and expelled
students with their constitutionally guaranteed education.
Alternative education programs are not uncommon.4 For example, alternative programs are already operating in seventy-six out of
215 school districts in Massachusetts.4 7 Although only thirty-five of
these programs currently reach students who have been suspended or

44
45

Id. at 311.

MARTIN GOLD & DAVID W. MANN, ExPELLED TO A FRIENDLIER PLACE: A STUDY OF
EFFECTIVE ALTERNATIVE SCHOOLS 151 (1984). Gold and Mann conducted a study that com-

pared students at alternative schools with those at conventional schools. They found that
students viewed the alternative schools as more flexible. Id. They further found that those
students who believed their school to be more flexible were more confident in their academic abilities. Id. Indeed, the study found that the alternative students had a better opinion of their academic abilities than did the conventional school students. Id. This belief
remained with these students even after their return to conventional schools. Id. at 108-09.
The alternative school students demonstrated behavioral improvements, which also survived their return to conventional schools. Id. at 151.
46 Alternative schools are usually small and offer counseling and conflict resolution as
part of the educational program. In 1994, Virginia funded four alternative schools and is
planning three more in 1995. Michael D. Shear & Debbi Wilgoren, Expusions Rise as
Schools Get Tough on Viwlnce, WASH. POST, July 10, 1994, at B1, B4.
NewJersey, too, is in the process of establishing alternative schools. These schools are
actually aimed specifically at expelled students, unlike many alternative schools currently
in existence. Rene Sanchez, ExpulsionsBecomingPopularWeapon in U.S. Schools, WASH. PoST,
Jan 20, 1995, at Al.
47 Jordana Hart, Group Urges Ban on ExpellingPupils,BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 18, 1994, at
29.
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expelled, or who have dropped out,4 Boston officials are considering
the prospect of establishing boarding schools for expelled students. 49
Massachusetts is not alone in its efforts to provide alternative education. In Washington, D.C., the police department has become involved in providing alternative education to problem students. 50 The
program, funded by private donations, was designed to reach sus51
pended students who are often merely "suspended to the streets."
Although attendance is purely voluntary, the program has been fairly
52
successful, increasing self-esteem and improving students' attitudes.
Recently, Maryland has gone even further in providing alternative education for problem students. In 1994, the Maryland General Assem53
bly earmarked $1.8 million for the state's first alternative school.
The school is designed for disruptive and aggressive middle-school
students. These students will return to their conventional schools after a minimum stay of three months at the alternative school where,
along with typical school work, the students will be taught ways to
manage their behavior. Again, the program will be completely
54
voluntary.
Another innovation in alternative education is the charter
school.5 5 Minnesota was the first state to pass charter school legislation. Under this legislation, someone wishing to create an alternative
school applies to state and local auth6rities for a three-year charter to
operate the school. The charter contains an option for renewal after
the first three years. 56 If approved, the charter school receives the
same state funding as the public schools.5 7 The idea seems to be

working in Minnesota. The oldest charter school there, City Academy, has been quite successful. Out of seventeen graduates in its first
48

Id.

Jordana Hart, Alternatives Weighedfor Expelled Pupils:EducatorsDebateBoardingSchools,
BOSTON GLOBE, May 27, 1994, at 27. Massachusetts currently requires principals to expel
any student who is caught with a weapon or drugs. Although educators have voiced concerns about establishing boarding schools for these students because they fear that it will
encourage greater expulsion rates, it is an interesting alternative, offering, at the least, an
education to students who may not otherwise receive one. Id.
50 Patrice Gaines, The OtherLearningPlace: Suspendedfrom School, Children Get Love with
Their Lessonsfrom District Police, WASH. POST, Mar. 31, 1994, atJl.
51 Id. (quoting Lt. Wanda Francis of the Washington, D.C. Police Department's Youth
and Family Services Division).
52
Id.
53
Retha Hill, P.G. Site Setfor SchoolforDisruptive Youths: MarylandProgramAims to Head
Off Unlawfulness, WASH. PoST, May 12, 1994, at B3.
54
Id.
55
Peter Baker, ForVirginiaEducation, a Minnesota Model Popular "CharterSchools" Test
the Merits of Autonomy, WASH. POST, Dec. 5, 1994, at D1. Currently, 12 states, including
California, have passed charter school legislation. Id.
56
Id.
57 Id. This funding amounts to $3,800 per student along with aid and grants. The
charter school is not allowed to charge tuition or solicit private donations. Id.
49
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class, fifteen went on to post-secondary schools. In 1992, forty-five
dropouts, gang members, and teenage parents attended the school.5 8
The success of this charter school with so-called "problem students"
suggests that similar schools could be created to meet the educational
needs of suspended and expelled students.
Because so many states already have facilities for the provision of
alternative education, the justification for expelling students without
making another alternative available hardly seems compelling.5 9 As
this Note demonstrates, the enforceable right to education provided
by many state constitutions cannot be overcome by the state's asserted
justification of maintaining peace in the public schools. As illustrated
by the success of currently existing alternative schools, there is a more
narrowly tailored means of achieving this goal.
C.

No Fundamental Right to Education under the Federal
Constitution

In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,60 the
Supreme Court held that education is not a fundamental right protected by the federal Constitution. 6 ' The plaintiffs brought an action
against the school district, claiming that the Texas school system's reliance on local property taxes to finance public schools favored the
wealthy and violated equal protection. 62 Plaintiffs maintained that
large disparities in per-pupil expenditures resulted from the differences in the values of assessable property among the districts and thus
amounted to an equal protection violation. 63 The district court determined that classifications by wealth are inherently suspect and that
education is a fundamental right; it accordingly applied strict scrutiny
to find an equal protection violation. 64 The Supreme Court, however,
found that no suspect class was involved 65 and that education,
although important, is not a fundamental right guaranteed by the
Constitution. 6 6 The Court went on to apply a rational basis standard
58
59

Id.

60
61
62
65
64
65
66

411 U.S. 1 (1973).
Id.

At least one state already requires limited alternative education for expelled students. Under Connecticut law, expelled students under age sixteen must have two hours
of education per day. The city of Hartford has recently agreed to institute a new program
through which expelled students will receive group learning and counseling. The new
program will actually operate at a lower cost than the current program of individual tutoring. Robin Stansbury, Rebuilding Bridgesfor Expelled Kids: As Numbers Grow, New Joint Program to Provide Group Tutoring, Counseling, HARTFoRD CouArr, July 3, 1995, at B2.
Id. at 6.
Id.

Id. at 16. For a brief explanation of equal protection analysis, see infra part I.C.I.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 37-38.
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of review and held that because the school funding system was rationally related to the legitimate state purpose of permitting participation
in and control of educational programs at the local level, it did not
67
violate the Equal Protection Clause.
The holding in Rodriguez suggests that it will be virtually impossible for suspended or expelled students to state a claim for alternative
education under the federal Constitution because of the lack of a federal fundamental right to education. There is, however, some suggestion that education may be a sufficiently important interest to warrant
a somewhat higher level of scrutiny under equal protection analysis
than the rational basis standard applied by the Rodriguez Court.
In Plyler v. Doe,68 the plaintiffs, school-age children of Mexican

origin who could not establish that they had been legally admitted
into the United States, brought an action challenging Texas education laws, which withheld state funds from local school districts for the
education of undocumented children. 69 Apparently applying the rational basis test, 70 the Court held that the law violated equal protec-

tion because the state could not demonstrate a substantial interest in
denying undocumented children the free public education that it provided to all other children. 7 1 Although the Court reiterated that education is not a fundamental right, it did note that, because of its
importance in maintaining basic institutions and the impact of its deprivation on the life of a child, education is more than "some governmental 'benefit' indistinguishable from other forms of social welfare
legislation." 72 Although not explicitly acknowledging that it was doing
so, the Court seemed to impose a higher level of scrutiny on state
regulations of education than the rational basis test by requiring the
state to show a "substantial state interest." The concurring opinions of
Justices Powell and Blackmun acknowledged that the Court applied or
67
68

Id. at 55.
457 U.S. 202 (1982).

69

Id. at 205.

70 Commentators have argued that the Plyler Court actually applied an intermediate
scrutiny analysis. For example, Amy Schmitz has suggested that the Court actually employed "'intermediate' or 'heightened' scrutiny" under which "courts uphold a legislative
distinction only if it is substantially related to an important government interest." AmyJ.
Schmitz, Note, Providingan Escapefor Inner-City Children: Creatinga FederalRemedy forEducational ills of Poor Urban Schools, 78 MiN. L. REv. 1639, 1647-48 (1994). Similarly, Professor
Ronald Kahn has said:
The case is unique because it is the only one in which the Court found a
right to education not to be constitutionally fundamental, but not to be

constitutionally unimportant either, the case thus represents a kind of fundamental rights analogue of "intermediate scrutiny" in the gender area of
equal protection.
Ronald Kahn, The Supreme Court as a (Counter)MajoritarianInstitution: Misperceptions of the
Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist Courts, 1994 Dr. C.L REv. 1, 32.
71 457 U.S. at 230.
72 Id. at 222.
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could have applied a somewhat higher standard of review in the Plyler
73
case.

Despite the possibility that the Plyler Court employed a higher
level of review, the majority did not explicitly recognize this heightened review. Therefore, it is unlikely that a suspended or expelled
student could successfully state a claim for alternative education
under the federal Constitution. 74 A student's claim for alternative ed-

ucation would be more likely to succeed under a state constitution
where a fundamental, or at least an enforceable, right to education
has been recognized.
II
THE STATES

A. The Protection of Civil Rights and the State Constitutions
Increasingly, litigators are asserting claims for the protection of
civil rights under state constitutions. 75 Many commentators suggest
Id. at 238-39 (Powell, J., concurring); Id. at 235 n.3 (Blackmun J., concurring).
74 Although difficult, stating a claim for alternative education under the federal Constitution may not be impossible. As noted above, the Court in Plyler did appear to apply an
intermediate level of review. Furthermore, the Court has recognized that both Plylerand
Rodriguez left open "the possibility 'that some identifiable quantum of education is a constitutionally protected prerequisite to the meaningful exercise of either [the right to speak or
the right to vote].'" Papasan v. Alain, 478 U.S. 265, 284 (1986) (quoting Rodiguez, 411
U.S. at 36) (alteration in original). The PapasanCourt further explained that it "has not
yet definitively settled the questions whether a minimally adequate education is a fundamental right and whether a statute alleged to discriminatorily infringe that right should be
accorded heightened equal protection review." Id. at 285.
It is possible that a suspended or expelled student could argue that a minimally adequate education is indeed a fundamental right and that his or her suspension or expulsion
without provision for alternative education excessively infringes upon that right. In
Papasan,the Court explicitly pointed out the importance of education to the ability to take
advantage of other rights, such as the right to vote and the right to speak freely. Plylertoo
enunciated the importance of education and rested not only on the strength of the education right, but also on the consequences of the denial of education to the children
affected.
Commentators have also recognized this aspect of Plyler. Schmitz has pointed out that
"[the Court granted the illegal aliens special constitutional protection not only because of
the importance of education, but also because denial of education would marginalize them
from political participation if they later became United States citizens." Schmitz, supra
note 70, at 1651 (citing Plyler, 457 U.S. at 229-30 (Powell, J., concurring)).. Certainly, a
suspended .or expelled student faces these same consequences. The possibility of these
students being unable to participate meaningfully in the political process is perhaps even
greater than for the Plyler plaintiffs because most suspended or expelled students are already citizens. Similarly, Professor Kahn has noted that "[w]hat is most intriguing is that
this near-right [to education] is based on a structural notion-the fear of creating future
groups with limited political power." Kahn, supra note 70, at 32. As this Note explains,
suspended or expelled students, especially those who eventually drop out of school, are in
a position to lose any chance of political power. See infra part i.A.
75
Helen Hershkoff, State Constitutions: A NationalPerspectiv 3 WIDENERJ. PUB. L. 7, 78 (1993).
73
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that the reason for the increase in claims based on state constitutions
is the current reluctance of the United States Supreme Court to expand, or sometimes even to maintain,7 6 civil rights under the federal
Constitution.7 7 It is also important to note, however, that resort to
state constitutions for the protection of civil rights is not a new proposition due only to the changing political sentiment of the federal
court system. Since before the application of the federal Bill of Rights
to the states and throughout this country's history, state constitutions
have been employed to protect the civil rights and liberties of
individuals.78
For litigants attempting to enforce civil rights not clearly protected by the federal Constitution or clearly unprotected by it, state
constitutions offer great advantages. The United States Supreme
Court cannot review a state court's ruling based on the state constitution.79 In the realm of the state constitution, the state's highest court
is the ultimate interpretive authority.8 0 Therefore, a state court is free
to hold that the state constitution protects rights that the federal Constitution does not81 or that the state constitution offers greater protecSee, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 853 (1992)

76

(dramatically cutting back the protection afforded reproductive rights under Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973), although maintaining Roes core holding).
77

See, e.g., JENNIFER FRIESEN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: LITIGATING INDIVIDUAL

CLAIMS AND DEFENSE 1 1.01, at 1-5 (1994) ("Renewed interest in state law is in part
a response to the perception that national rights are no longer interpreted as generously as
RIGHTS,

in previous decades."); Stanley H. Friedelbaum, Preface to HuMAN RIGHTS IN THE STATES:
NEw DIRECTIONS IN CONSTITUTIONAL POLICYMAKING vii (Stanley H. Friedelbaum ed., 1988)

("As the U.S. Supreme Court continued to retreat from the unusual activism of the Warren
years, so judges in a number of states moved beyond federal guarantees. ..

.").

Senior

Judge Constance Baker Motley has offered a powerful narrative regarding the "conservative backlash" that has affected the United States Supreme Court and the reaction of many
state courts. The Honorable Constance Baker Motley, Civil Rights-CivilLibertie Litigationin
the U.S. Supreme Court: Are the State Courts Our Only Hope?, 9 HAv. BLAcKLETrER J. 101
(1992). In that piece, SeniorJudge Motley states:
There is a concerted effort now underway to shut the federal courthouse
door to civil rights-civil liberties petitioners of all description; and there is a
real danger that the federal courts, led by the Supreme Court, will relinquish their role in society as the primary guardian of the Bill of Rights and
the people's shield against abusive government action. The good news is
that elected state courtjudges, the peoples' representatives in the judiciary,
as well as appointed state court judges may be responding to the beat of
another drummer.
Id. at 102.
78 Hershkoff, supra note 75, at 14-15.
79 FRIESEN, supra note 77, 1 1.07, at 1-56.
80

Id.

81

See infra part II.B.; see also PeterJ. Galie, Social Services and EgalitarianActivism, in

HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE STATES: NEW DIRECTIONS IN CONSTITUTIONAL POLICYMAKING 97, 106-

07 (Stanley H. Friedelbaum ed., 1988) (explaining that the New York Court of Appeals has
interpreted the New York State Constitution to "impose[ I on the state an affirmative duty
to aid the needy") (quoting Tucker v. Toia, 371 N.E.2d 449, 452 (N.Y. 1977)).
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tion for a right that is recognized under the federal Constitution.8 2
83
Many state courts have explicitly acknowledged this principle.
If, however, a state court cites federal precedent to support its
ruling, the United States Supreme Court may be able to review the
state court's decision.8 4 In order to avoid this result, a state court that
cites federal precedent must include a "plain statement" of its "reliance on independent and adequate state grounds."8 5 When United
States Supreme Court review is allowed, the Court may either reverse
or affirm on the federal grounds and remand to the state court, or it
may vacate the decision and remand with instructions to consider an
86
intervening Supreme Court decision bearing on the federal issue.
Because of this possibility of Supreme Court review, a state court must
clearly explain that its decision relies on independent and adequate
state grounds, notwithstanding the federal precedent cited in the
opinion.
As the next Part demonstrates, in many states, education is an
enforceable right under the state constitution despite the fact that it is
not recognized as such under the federal Constitution. Many state
courts have developed a significant constitutional jurisprudence based
solely on the state's constitutional guarantee of education.
B. Education Clauses in State Constitutions
Most of the courts that have interpreted the education clauses of
state constitutions have done so in the context of determining the
82
Kathryn Kolbert & David H. Gans, Responding to Planned Parenthood v. Casey: Establishing Neutrality: Principles in State Constitutional Law, 66 TEMP. L Q. 1151, 1158-59
(1993); see, e.g., id. at 1161-62 (describing cases in which-state courts have interpreted state
constitutions to require the strict scrutiny standard of review for laws impinging on a
woman's right to choose abortion); Motley, supranote 77, at 104 (noting that several state
courts have interpreted state constitutions to provide greater protection of the freedom of
speech than the federal Constitution).
83 See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 950 (Cal. 1976) ("[Olur state equal protection provisions, while 'substantially the equivalent of' the guarantees contained in the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, are possessed of an independent vitality which, in a given case, may demand an analysis different from that which would
obtain if only the federal standard were applicable."); Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359, 371
(Conn. 1977) ("[D]ecisions of the United States Supreme Court defining fundamental
rights are persuasive authority to be afforded respectful consideration, but they are to be
followed by Connecticut courts only when they provide no less individual protection than
is guaranteed by Connecticut law."); Skeen v. Minnesota, 505 N.W.2d 299, 313 (Minn.
1993) ("Minnesota is not limited by the United States Supreme Court and can provide
more protection under the state constitution than is afforded under the federal constitution."); Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 332 (Wyo. 1980) ("A
state may enlarge rights under the Fourteenth Amendment announced by the Supreme
Court of the United States, which are considered minimal, and thus a state constitutional
provision may be more demanding than the equivalent federal constitutional provision.").
84 FPRiSEN, supra note 77, 1 1.07, at 1-60.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 1-61.
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constitutionality of state funding systems for public schools. The state
courts that have addressed the issue vary in their determinations of
what kind of right the state constitutions' education clauses provide.
Some courts have characterized the right to education as very strong
while others have limited it. A few courts have considered the education clause completely independent of equal protection in striking
down a school funding system as unconstitutional. However, most
courts have relied on the education clause only as the source of the
right to education and then have applied equal protection analysis to
that right.
1. States Looking Only to the Education Clause
At least two courts have looked to the education clause independently rather than applying equal protection analysis when deciding
whether a school funding system was unconstitutional. In Seattle School
DistrictNo. 1 v. State,8 7 a school district, taxpayers (some of whom were
members of the school board) with children enrolled in and attending the schools in the district, and students in the district sought to
have the state's public education funding system declared unconstitutional.88 Under that system, districts were required to provide educational programs that complied with various state statutes and
regulations; however, they were not given enough state funding to do
so.8 9 Instead, the state allocated partial funding through special excess levy elections. 9 0 Of course, there was nothing to guarantee that
the voters would approve requests for levies, and these special levy
elections could be held no more than twice a year.9 1 Meanwhile, the
92
school districts had no other authority to raise the necessary funds.
In 1975, School District No. 1 submitted two excess levy proposals,
both of which failed. 93 Other districts were experiencing similar revenue losses under the state's system. 94 The lower court found that such
levy failures adversely affected the quality of education that a district
95
could provide.
In finding for the plaintiffs, the Washington Supreme Court examined the state constitution's education clause, which provides that
the state's duty to "make ample provision for the education of all chil87
88

585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978).
Id. at 78.

89

Id. at 77-78.

90
91

Id.
Id.

92

Id.

93

Id.

94

Id.

95

Id. at 78.
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dren" is "paramount."96 The court determined that this language imposed a mandatory duty on 'the state.9 7 It then went on to determine
that the duty imposed by the constitutional language is a "paramount"
duty, and that the corresponding right, possessed by all Washington
State children, "has equal stature." 98 The court distinguished this
"'right' to be amply provided with an education" from other so-called
rights, -which are merely liberties or privileges that, given the proper
level of state interest, can be invaded. Instead, the court determined
that the right in question was a "true 'right' (or absolute)."99
The court then went on to define the duty imposed by the Washington State Constitution. Although it refused to specify guidelines
for making ample provision for education, 10 0 the court did state:
[T]he State's constitutional duty goes beyond mere reading, writing
and arithmetic. It also embraces broad educational opportunities
needed in the contemporary setting to equip our children for their
role as citizens and as potential competitors in today's market as
well as in ...the market place of ideas. Education plays a critical

role in a free society ....The constitutional right to have the State
'make ample provision for the education of all [resident] children'
would be hollow indeed if the possessor of the right could not compete adequately in our political system, in the labor market, or in
the market place of ideas. 01'
As this Note will explain, many of the concerns that the Washington
Supreme Court articulated are exactly the same problems that suspended and expelled students face.
Because the Washington court relied specifically on the education clause instead of performing an equal protection analysis, it is
possible that students in that state could assert a claim for alternative
10 2
education based solely on the state constitution's education clause.
This Note focuses, however, on equal protection challenges because
most state courts that have construed constitutional education provi96 Id. at 84. The Washington State Constitution provides, "It is the paramount duty of
the state to make ample provision for the education of all children residing within its
borders, without distinction or preference on account of race, color, caste, or sex." WASH.
CONST. art. IX, § 1. It goes on to state, "The legislature shall provide for a general and
uniform system of public schools." Id. art. IX, § 2. '
97 585 P.2d at 84-87 (rejecting several arguments by the state and arriving at the conclusion that the Washington Constitution's education clause places a mandatory duty on
the state legislature).
98 Id. at 91.
99 Id. at 93 n.13.
100 Id. at 95-96. The plaintiffs had asked the court to create judicial guidelines for the
legislature as to what specifically would satisfy the duty. The court declined to do so, stating its confidence that the legislature would take these concerns into consideration when
defining "basic education" and giving substantive content to the program. Id.
101 Id. at 94-95 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
102
See infra part HI.B.
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sions have done so in the context of equal protection analysis. The
Washington court did not specifically address the question of how the
right to education would fare under such an analysis; however, the
court's strong language regarding the important place education occupies in the state constitution suggests that the Washington court
would consider the right fundamental for equal protection purposes
if it were called upon to make that determination.
The New Jersey Supreme Court likewise invalidated that state's
public school funding system, relying exclusively on the state constitu1 0 3 the court examined a
tion's education clause. In Robinson v. Cahill,
school funding system similar to Washington's in that it relied on local
property taxes to a great extent to fund public education and did not
10 4
provide for substantial state aid to equalize the resulting disparities.
The court invalidated the system, holding that the state constitution's
education clause placed the duty "to maintain and support a thorough and efficient system of free public schools" on the state, and that
when the state chooses to delegate that duty it must do so in a manner
"which will fulfill that obligation." 0 5 Hence, because the system in
question "ha[d] no apparent relation to the mandate for equal educational opportunity," the state had the duty to rectify the situation. 10 6
Unlike the Washington court, the New Jersey court addressed an
equal protection argument. The court refused to hold that education
was a fundamental right for equal protection purposes, citing the difficulty it would have in explaining why education, and not some other
constitutionally mandated service, warranted fundamental-right statUs.' 0 7 Therefore, in New Jersey, a suspended or expelled student
would probably be most likely to succeed on a claim for alternative
education if that claim were based exclusively on the education clause.
2.

State Courts Recognizing a FundamentalRight to Education

Many state courts have held that education is a fundamental right
for purposes of equal protection analysis under their state constitu103
104

303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973).
Id. at 276-77.

105 Id. at 292. The NewJersey Constitution states, "The legislature shall provide for the
maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient system of free public schools for the
instruction of all the children in this state between the ages of five and eighteen years."
N.J. CONSr. art. VIII, § 4.
106 303 A.2d at 295-96.
107
Id. at 284-86. The court explained that it would be "difficult... to find an objective
basis to say that the equal protection clause selects education and demands inflexible statewide uniformity in expenditure." Id. at 284. The court went on to explain that the fact
that public education was explicitly mentioned in the state constitution was not enough to
bestow fundamental-right status upon it because the NewJersey Constitution mandates "a
vast range of services," and it would be unreasonable to suggest that all of these services
must be declared fundamental rights. Id. at 285.
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tions' education clauses. Again, most of these decisions were reached
in the course of determining whether a state public school funding
system was constitutional. However, the courts have differed in their
characterizations of the right involved and in the degree of protection
they have been willing to give that right.
A number of courts have clearly held that education is a fundamental right requiring strict scrutiny equal protection analysis with no
reservations. For example, in Rose v. Council for Better Education,
Inc.,' 08 the Kentucky Supreme Court held the state's common school
system unconstitutional because it was not "efficient" as required by
that state constitution's education clause. 10 9 In so holding, the court
explicitly stated, "A child's right to an adequate education is a fundamental one under our Constitution."110 Similarly, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court, in District of Wilkinsburg v. Wilkinsburg Education
Ass'n,"' stated that "public education in Pennsylvania is a fundamental right" and that "this court has consistently examined problems re1 2
lated to schools in the context of that fundamental right."
Courts in Connecticut and Alabama have also held that their state
constitutions afford a fundamental right to education. In Horton v.
Meskill,1 3 the Connecticut Supreme Court upheld the lower court's
determination that the state's system of funding public schools was
unconstitutional under the state constitution. In so doing, the court
stated that "the right to education is so basic and fundamental that
14
Simiany infringement of that right must be strictly scrutinized."
larly, an Alabama trial court declared the state's public education
funding system unconstitutional because many of the state's schools
790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989).
Id. at 189. The Kentucky Constitution provides, "The General Assembly shall, by
appropriate legislation, provide for an efficient system of common schools throughout the
State." KY. CONST. § 183.
110 790 S.W.2d at 212.
111 667 A.2d 5 (Pa. 1995). Unlike many of the education-clause cases, this Pennsylvania case did not involve a challenge to the state's school funding system. Instead, the
school district had attempted to enter into a contract with a private party to operate a
school. Id. at 6. The chancellor had granted the Education Association's request to enjoin
the district from entering the contract. Id. The Association had claimed that the school
code did not authorize the district to enter into such a contract. Id. On appeal, the district
argued, among other things, that if the Association's interpretation of the code was correct, it was unconstitutional because under the circumstances, without entering into the
contract, the district would not be able to meet the constitutionally mandated requirement
of a "thorough and efficient system of public education." Id. at 8.
112 Id. at 9. The Pennsylvania Constitution provides, "The General Assembly shall provide for the maintenance of a thorough and efficient system of public education to serve
the needs of the Commonwealth." PA. CONST. art. 3, § 14.
113 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977).
114 Id. at 373. The Connecticut Constitution provides, "There shall always be free public elementary and secondary schools in the state." CONN. CONST. art. 8, § 1.
108
109
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fell below minimal standards.1 15 Although the system did not withstand even the rational basis test, the court found education to be a
fundamental right accorded strict scrutiny for purposes of equal pro16
tection review under the Alabama Constitution.'
Other courts that have found a fundamental right to education
embodied in a state constitution have also declared wealth to be a
suspect classification in holding a school funding system unconstitutional. For example, in Serrano v. Priest,"7 the California Supreme
Court held that the state's funding system was unconstitutional.1 18 In
so holding, the court employed a strict scrutiny equal protection analysis. The use of this heightened scrutiny was predicated on the existence of both a fundamental right and a suspect classification,
wealth."19 The court did not state whether it would have employed
heightened scrutiny based solely on the infringement of the fundamental right to education; however, it is likely, based upon the common treatment of fundamental rights for purposes of equal
12 0
protection analysis, that the court would have done so.
Other courts have varied in the degree of protection that they
have afforded to the fundamental right to education or have attached
a caveat to their holding that such a fundamental right exists. For
example, in Bismarck Public School District No. 1 v. State,' 2 1 the North
Dakota Supreme Court, in declaring the state's public school funding
system unconstitutional, found education to be a fundamental right
under the state's constitution.12 2 The court, however, refused to apply
115
Alabama Coalition for Equity, Inc. v. Hunt, 19 IDELR 810, 839 (1993). But cf.
C.LS. v. Hoover Bd. of Educ., 594 S.2d 138 (Ala. Civ. App. 1991) (holding that the Alabama Constitution creates an entitlement to public education). The Alabama Constitution
provides, "The legislature shall establish, organize and maintain a liberal system of public
schools throughout the state for the benefit of the children thereof between the ages of
seven and 21 years." ALA. CONST. art. 4, § 256.
116 Alabama CoalitionforEquity, 19 IDELR at 838.
117 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976).
118
Id. at 952-53. The California Constitution provides, "A general diffusion of knowledge and intelligence being essential to the preservation of the rights and liberties of the
people, the Legislature shall encourage by all suitable means the promotion of intellectual,
scientific, moral, and agricultural improvement." .CAL. CONSr. art. 9, § 1. It goes on to
state, "The Legislature shall provide for a system of common schools by which a free school
shall be kept up and supported in each district at least six months in every year." Id. art. 9,
§ 5.
119 557 P.2d at 951. Another court that -has taken this approach is the Wyoming
Supreme Court. See Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 334
(Wyo.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980). However, in Simons v. Laramie County School
District No. 1, 741 P.2d 1116, 1125 (Wyo. 1987), the Wyoming Supreme Court applied
strict scrutiny analysis based solely on the fundamental right to education.
120 For a brief explanation of equal protection analysis, see infra part III.C.1.
121 511 N.W.2d 247 (N.D. 1994).
122 Id. at 256. The North Dakota Constitution provides, "The legislative assembly shall
provide for a uniform system of free public schools throughout the state." N.D. CoNsr. art.
VIII, § 2. The North Dakota Constitution also provides:
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the strict scrutiny standard to the funding system because legislative
determinations regarding taxation and fiscal planning were "ill-suited
for strict scrutiny analysis." 123 The court instead applied an intermedi-

ate level of scrutiny. 12 4 In the case of a suspended or expelled student
seeking access to alternative education, it is conceivable that the
North Dakota Supreme Court would apply the strict scrutiny standard
because presumably the same types of legislative determinations
would not be involved.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has also held that different standards of review will be applied to state regulations implicating the
right to education depending on the type of challenge involved. In
Skeen v. Minnesota,125 the court held that there was a fundamental
right to "a 'general and uniform system of education'"'126 but that the
constitutional requirement that the state's public school funding system be "thorough and efficient" did not create a fundamental
right. 127 Therefore, the court determined that:
while strict scrutiny analysis should be applied in determining
whether the legislature has met a student's fundamental right to a
general and uniform system of public schools, a lesser standard,
such as a rational basis test, should apply to the determination of
whether the financing of such a system is. "thorough and
8
efficient."12

Again, it is probable that a suspended or expelled student's claim for
alternative education would fall into the fundamental right, strict scrutiny half of the Minnesota Supreme Court's analysis.
Both the Virginia Supreme Court and the Wisconsin Supreme
Court have held that a fundamental right to education exists but that
A high degree of intelligence, patriotism, integrity and morality on the part
of every voter in a government by the people being necessary in order to
insure the continuance of that government and the prosperity and happiness of the people, the legislative assembly shall make provision for the
establishment and maintenance of a system of public schools which shall be
open to all children of the state of North Dakota and free from sectarian
control. This legislative requirement shall be irrevocable without the consent of the United States and the people of North Dakota.
I& art. VIII, § 1.
123 511 N.W.2d at 256-57.
124

Id.

125
126
127

505 N.W.2d 299 (Minn. 1993).
Id. at 315 (quoting MiNN. CONsT. art. VIII, § 1).
Id. (quoting MINN. CONST. art. VIII, § 3). The Minnesota Constitution provides:
The stability of a republican form of government depending mainly upon
the intelligence of the people, it is the duty of the legislature to establish a
general uniform system of public schools. The legislature shall make such
provisions by taxation or otherwise as will secure a thorough and efficient
system of public schools throughout the state.

MNN. CONST. art. XIII, § 1.

128

505 N.W.2d at 315.

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81:582

there is no requirement of equal funding under their state constitutions. In Scott v. Commonwealth of Virginia,129 the court held that,
although there is a fundamental right to education under the Virginia
Constitution, strict scrutiny analysis did not require "equal, or substantially equal, funding or programs among and within the Commonwealth's school districts."'u 0 The Wisconsin Supreme Court went even
further in Kukor v. Grover'31 and held that, although "education is, to a
certain degree, a fundamental right," only a rational basis review
would be applied to spending disparities because "a complete denial
of educational opportunity" was not involved.' 3 2 It is much more difficult to predict how these courts would decide if faced with a challenge
by a suspended or expelled student for access to alternative education.
It is certainly possible that at least the Wisconsin court would reject
such a challenge because, based on the language quoted above, it
does not seem to have even held with any certainty that a strong fundamental right to education exists.
3.

Courts Offering Different Treatments of Education Clauses

Other state courts have been less clear in determining what sort
of right, if any, is supplied by the state's education clause. For example, the North Carolina courts have found a fundamental right to
equal access to education embodied in the North Carolina Constitution. However, this right differs from a fundamental right to education in that it does not require that students receive an equal
education, but merely equal access to whatever education is provided.' 3 3 Also, the New Hampshire Supreme Court has held that the
129 443 S.E.2d 138 (Va. 1994).
130 Id. at 142. The Virginia Constitution provides, "The General Assembly shall provide for a system of free public elementary and secondary schools for all children throughout the Commonwealth and shall seek to ensure that an educational program of high
quality is established and continually maintained." VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1. It goes on to
state, "Standards of quality... shall be determined and prescribed... by the Board of
Education, subject to revision only by the General Assembly." Id. art. VIII, § 2. It continues, "The General Assembly shall provide for the compulsory elementary and secondary
education of every eligible child of appropriate ages...." Id. art. VIII, § 3.
'31
436 N.W.2d 568 (Wis. 1989).
132
Id. at 579-80. The Wisconsin Constitution provides:
The legislature shall provide by law for the establishment of district schools,
which shall be as nearly uniform as practicable; and such schools shall be
free and without charge for tuition to all children between the ages of 4
and 20 years; and no sectarian instruction shall be allowed therein; but the
legislature by law may, for the purpose of religious instruction outside the
district schools, authorize the release of students during regular school
hours.
Wis. CONST. art. 10, § 3.
133
Sneed v. Board of Educ., 264 S.E.2d 106 (N.C. 1980) (holding that equal access to
education is a fundamental right under the state constitution); Britt v. North Carolina St.
Bd. of Educ., 357 S.E.2d 432 (N.C. Ct. App.) (clarifying that the fundamental right embodied in the North Carolina Constitution is to equal access, not to an equal education; each
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state constitution imposes a duty on the state to provide education to
its citizens.13 4 The court did not explicitly find the corresponding
right to be fundamental, but it did acknowledge that the right to education was "at the very least an important, substantive right."1 35
Still other courts have held that their state constitutions do not
.provide fundamental rights to education or have not yet addressed
the issue. For example, the Maryland Court of Appeals has held that
the right to an adequate education in Maryland is not fundamental
merely because of the state constitutional mandate that there be a
"thorough and efficient" statewide system of public schools.1 3 6 Like
the North Dakota Supreme Court in Bismarck PublicSchool DistrictNo. 1
v. State,l3 7 the Maryland court noted that strict scrutiny analysis is
often avoided when social or economic legislation is involved. However, unlike the North Dakota court, the Maryland court extended
this reasoning to find that the right to education is not fundamental
under the Maryland Constitution.' 3 8
Recently, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court also held
that that state's constitutional education clause did not incorporate a
fundamental right to education. In McDuffy v. Secretary of the Executive
Office of Education,'3 9 that court had found an enforceable right to education, but left open the question of whether this right was a fundamental one. 4° Despite very strong language in McDuffy, suggesting
student need not be provided with identical opportunities), dismissal allowed, review denied,
361 S.E.2d 71 (N.C. C. App. 1987).
The North Carolina Constitution provides, "The General Assembly shall provide by
taxation and otherwise for a general and uniform system of free public schools, which shall
be maintained at least nine months in every year, and wherein equal opportunities shall be
provided for all students." N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 2(1). "Education encouraged. Religion,
morality and knowledge being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools, libraries and the means of education shall forever be encouraged." Id. art.

IX, § 1.
134
Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 635 A.2d 1375 (N.H. 1993). The New Hampshire Constitution provides, "[I]t shall be the duty of the legislators and magistrates, in all
future periods of this government, to cherish the interest of literature and the sciences,
and all seminaries and public schools...." N.H. CONST. Pt. 2, art. 83.
'35
635 A.2d at 1381.
136 Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758, 786 (Md. 1983). The
Maryland Constitution provides, "The General Assembly, at its first session after the adoption of this Constitution, shall by Law establish throughout the State a thorough and efficient System of Free Public Schools." MD. CONST. art. VIII, § 8.
137
511 N.W.2d 247 (N.D. 1994). For a discussion of Bismarck, see supratext accompanying notes 121-24.
138
458 A.2d at 786.
139 615 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1993).
140 Id. The Massachusetts Constitution provides:
Wisdom, and knowledge, as well as virtue, diffused generally among the
body of the people, being necessary for the preservation of their rights and
liberties; and as these depend on spreading the opportunities and advantages of education in the various parts of the country, and among the different orders of the people, it shall be the duty of legislatures and magistrates,
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the possibility of a fundamental right to education in Massachusetts, 141 the Supreme Judicial Court recently held, in Doe v. Superintendent of Schools,' 42 that the Massachusetts Constitution does not provide
143
students with a fundamental right to education.
III
CLAIMS FOR ALTERNATIVE EDUCATION

This Part examines policy arguments that support a claim for alternative education for suspended or expelled students. By demonstrating the drastic effects that suspension and expulsion can have on
students, this Part illustrates how these disciplinary measures greatly
infringe on the fundamental right to education. This Part then briefly
focuses on the possibility of stating a claim for alternative education
exclusively under a state constitution's education clause. Next, it examines the equal protection analysis of a fundamental right to education in the context of claims for alternative education by suspended or
expelled students.' 4 4 Finally, this Part examines the disparate treatin all future periods of this commonwealth, to cherish the interests of literature and the sciences, and all seminaries of them; especially the University
at Cambridge, public schools and grammar schools in the towns ....
MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 5, § 2.
141 The court stated:
[We believe that the placement of the education provisions in Part I, The
Frame of Government, is a forceful statement that education is both a duty
of and a prerequisite for republican government. And, if "legislatures and
magistrates" have a constitutional duty to educate, then members of the
Commonwealth have a correlative constitutional right to be educated.
615 N.E.2d at 527 n.23 (citing Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978)).
The opinion goes on to say:
What emerges.., is that the Commonwealth has a duty to provide an education for all its children, rich and poor, in every city and town of the Commonwealth at the public school level, and that this duty is designed not only
to serve the interests of the children, but, more fundamentally, to prepare
them to participate as free citizens of a free State to meet the needs and
interests of a republican government. ...
Id. at 548 (emphasis in original).
142 653 N.E.2d 1088 (Mass. 1995).
143 Id. at 1095. For a more thorough discussion ofDoe, see infra part mI.C.2.b.
144 Relying solely on a state constitution may not be the only way for suspended or
expelled students to receive alternative education through the courts. In Donaldson v.
O'Connor,493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded, 422 U.S. 563 (1975), the Fifth
Circuit held that when mental patients are deprived of their constitutional right to liberty,
they are entitled to the quid pro quo right of treatment. At least one commentator has
suggested that a similar argument could be made on behalf of students attempting to enforce a right to education. Charles M. Masner, Note, EducationalMalpracticeand a Right to
Education:Should Compulsoy EducationLaws Require a Quid Pro Quo?, 21 WASHBURN LJ. 555,
568 (1982). In effect, the argument is that, like mental patients confined under the police
power, students are to a certain extent deprived of a liberty interest by compulsory attendance laws which require that they attend school, and therefore they must be provided the
quid pro quo of education. Accordingly, the student's liberty is unjustifiably infringed
unless an opportunity to receive an education is actually provided. Id. at 574-75. Masner's
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ment of disabled and nondisabled students for suspension and expulsion purposes. This treatment further supports the argument that
these disciplinary measures are not narrowly tailored to achieve the
state's goals.
A. Policy Arguments
Approximately one and a half million students miss a large portion of school each year because they have been suspended or expelled. 154 Only about three percent of these -suspensions and
expulsions are imposed to punish major offenses. 146 Most suspended
and expelled students miss school for minor offenses, such as smoking, tardiness, truancy, and dress code violations. 147 Even without a
fundamental right to education, these drastic disciplinary actions are
hard to justify for such minor offenses.
Of course, some students are expelled or suspended for major
offenses, such as possession of weapons. However, even with regard to
these more disruptive and sometimes potentially dangerous behaviors,
school districts may be overreacting in expelling students. Throughout the United States, school boards are requiring expulsions for a
48
term of one year for any student found with a weapon of any sort.
argument did not specifically address the issues of suspension and expulsion but focused
instead on educational malpractice. Id. at 568-69. However, a similar argument could conceivably be made for students who have been suspended or expelled.
This argument, however, is fairly weak because a suspended or expelled student is no
longer forced to attend school and is therefore not deprived of his or her liberty interest.
In Adams v. Dothan Board of Education, 485 So. 2d 757, 760 (Ala. Civ. App. 1986), an expelled student argued that, because of compulsory attendance laws and the school board's
lack of statutory authorization to expel students, only a juvenile court should have the
authority to decide whether a student should be expelled. 485 S.2d 757, 760 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1986). The court held that "a student is entitled and indeed required to attend
school under our compulsory education law. However, this does not mean that a student
may escape the consequences of his misconduct at school." Id. It is probably reasonable to
assume that most courts would hold as the Alabama court did when the state laws not only
impose compulsory attendance but also authorize expulsion and suspension as potential
punishment for violations of school rules. Therefore, this Note focuses on the fundamental right to education and equal protection as the better means of achieving alternative
education for suspended and expelled students.
145 Daniel & Coriell, supra note 13, at 15.
In many school districts, the rates of suspensions and expulsions continue to increase.
For example, in the 1985-86 school year, there were only fourteen expulsions in Fairfax
County, but during the 1993-94 school year, that number rose to 153. Sanchez, supranote
46, at Al.
It is not merely older students who are being expelled; rather, very young children are
often punished by expulsion. For example, in Massachusetts, during the 1991-92 school
year, 574 students were expelled. Seventeen of these students were pre-kindergarten to
third-grade children. 203 were fourth through seventh graders. Hart, supra note 47, at 29.
146
Daniel & Coriell, supra note 13, at 15.
147 Gall Paulus Sorenson, The Worst Kind ofDiscipline,6 UPDATE ON LAw-RELATED EDUC.
26, 27 (Fall 1982).
148
Sanchez, supra note 46, at Al; see, e.g., WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9.41.280 (1994).
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Many of the school districts are including more than guns and knives
in their definitions of "weapons." For example, some districts have
determined that razors, slingshots, and toy guns are weapons.' 4 9
Many districts apply these disciplinary codes to very young students
and to students who merely threaten violence.' 5 0 Recently, President
Clinton authorized the Education Department to cease funding for
The effect of these laws is drastic. Educators in Massachusetts estimate that hundreds
of students have been expelled since that state passed its education reform law. Jordana
Hart, Expelled, She's Out of It: Ousted Student HasFew Options, BOSTON GLOBE, May 26, 1994,
at 1. In the Washington, D.C. area, more than 600 students were expelled in 1994. Shear
& Wilgoren, supra note 46, at B1. During the 1993-94 school year, 1,108 students in the
Washington, D.C. area were suspended, an increase of 173 suspensions from the prior
school year. Graciela Sevilla, School Suspensions Are Rising: Board'sStudy to Focus on Underlying Causes,WASH. Pos-r, Sept. 15, 1994, at MI. The rate of suspension increased by 14% in
elementary schools, 25% in middle schools, and 17% in high schools. Id.
Under a recently passed Michigan law, kindergartners through fifth graders will be
expelled for a minimum of 90 days for weapon possession, rape, or arson; the minimum
for older students is 180 days. Matt Davis & Margaret Trimer-Hartiey, Weapon in School?
You're Expelled, DEr. FREE PRESS, Sept. 22, 1994, at 1A. Although the schools are not required to provide students with alternative education, they are given the option of placing
students in alternative schools. Id. Requirements that these alternative schools be at separate locations or meet when other students are not in school, however, may create disincentives for school districts to provide alternative education by increasing the burden on
the school districts attempting to create alternative programs. Democrats in the state legislature attempted to include amendments requiringschools to provide alternative education,
but this proposal was rejected. Id. This Michigan law has already been the subject of litigadon. A probate courtjudge ruled that the school district must provide an expelled student
with an education. Lisa Holewa, Crackdown on Guns in School Challenged, DEr. FREE PRESS,
Nov. 24, 1994, at 2B. However, this ruling is currently being appealed. In a bizarre twist
on fundamental rights analysis, school superintendent Tommy Saylor said, "We believe
that a board of education has the fundamental right to expel a student from school forjust
cause. We think bringing a loaded gun to school is just cause." Id.
149
Sanchez, supra note 46, at Al. Administrators in one Massachusetts town have included geometry compasses in their definition of weapons. Jordana Hart, Creeping Violence
Worries Suburban Schools; Stricter Rules Enforced to Seize "Weapons," BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 18,
1994, at 15.
A 7-year-old was recently suspended from a Boston school for three days and ordered
to have a psychological evaluation. This excessive discipline was imposed when the child
brought a plastic water gun on the school bus. Similarly, a ten-year-old was suspended for
bringing a plastic toy space gun to school. Jordana Hart, Suspension Over Toy Gun Angers
Some, BOSTON GLOBE, May 5, 1994, at 33.
150 Sanchez, supra note 46, at Al. In Michigan, first- through fifth-grade students
caught with weapons must be expelled for at least 90 class days, while junior and senior
high school students must be expelled for a full school year. Id. Fresno, California is
instituting a similar policy that would apply to students as young as fourth graders. Id.
Expulsions are becoming the punishment of choice for offenses other than weapons
possession as well; infractions currently punishable by suspension and expulsion now include drug and alcohol possession. For example, a proposed policy in Virginia would require a ten-day suspension and a transfer to another school for any middle or high school
student caught on campus or at a school activity with drugs. Debbi Wilgoren, Schools Look
at TougherPunishments: Uniform PenaltiesDebatedfor Aloho DrugAbusers, WAsH. POST, Nov.
10, 1994, at V1. Students caught violating the drug policy more than once would be expelled. Id. Similarly, the same school board would require students found in possession of
alcohol to be suspended for the first violation, suspended and forced to transfer if caught
again, and expelled if caught a third time. Id.
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states that do not adopt a policy requiring one-year expulsions of students caught with guns. 15 1
Through education, the citizens and residents of this country
gain the knowledge and skills necessary to earn a living and to exercise their constitutional rights, such as the right to vote and the right
to free speech. When many of the members of a society lack the skills
necessary to exercise their rights and support themselves, there is a
strong probability that the fears of the Plyler Court will materialize as
increasing numbers of American citizens are denied a basic education
and thus forced into their own "underclass." 152 In this context, as well
as in that of aliens deprived of education, "the existence of such an
underclass presents most difficult problems for a Nation that prides
153
itself on adherence to principles of equality under law."
Because of the important role that education plays, notjust in the
life of an individual, but in a productive society generally, the constitutional right to education, afforded by many state constitutions, should
be enforced to protect children from losing the opportunities that an
education provides. As one commentator has said, "Determining guilt
or innocence may be important to the system of criminal justice, but it
is much less relevant in an education system that, as a matter of educa54
tional policy, provides some form of education to all students.'
1. Suspension and Expulsion: DroppingOut and Its Effects
Close to one million students drop out of school every year. 15 5
Suspension is one of the major factors explaining the decision to drop
out.156 This Part considers the adverse effects that dropping out of
151 KennethJ. Cooper, PresidentDirects Schools to Bar Students with Guns: Law Threatens
Elimination of FederalFunds, WAsH. PosT, Oct. 23, 1994, at AS. Although some of the districts require expelled students to attend alternative schools, others, like Michigan's, do
not. Sanchez, supra note 46, at Al.
152
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 219 (1982).
153 Id.
154 Sorenson, supra note 147, at 72. Sorenson argues that "[b]ecause education is so
important to the individual as well as to the society of which he is a member, it is essential
that we provide at least some educational services to every child, along a continuum from
least restrictive to most restrictive." Id.
155
R.C. SMITH & CAROL A. LINCOLN, AMERICA'S SHAME, AMERICA'S HOPE 3 (1988). In
Chicago, the dropout rate is close to 50%, nearing 70% for certain Chicago high schools.
John J.Lane, PrincipalPerceptions of the At-Risk Child, in CHILDREN AT RISK 45 (Joan M.
Lakebrink ed., 1989).
156
Pedro Reyes, Factors that Affect the Commitment of Children at Risk to Stay in School in
CHILDREN AT RISK supra note 155, at 18, 23. A 1985 study found that "schools with above
average suspension rates had higher dropout rates than schools with average suspension
rates." Id. at 24. It has been suggested that the long periods spent away from school by
some suspended students may at least partially account for the higher dropout rates because these students are not able to complete the work required for graduation. Id. at 25.
Another study included "being a discipline case," "irregular attendance and frequent
tardiness," and "active antagonism to teachers and principals" in a list of factors character-
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school has on the lives of these students. Because suspension and expulsion positively correlate with dropping, it is probable that the
problems associated with dropping out of school will often be experienced by suspended and expelled students..
Terence Thornberry et al. conducted a study examining the effect dropping out of school has on the level of an individual's criminal
behavior later in life. The group studied males who lived in Philadelphia at least from the age of ten to eighteen. 157 Even when social
status of origin, race, marital, and employment status were held constant, the study found that "dropping out of high school is positively
associated with later criminal activity."' 5 8
Dropping out of high school has other adverse effects on former
students. For example, dropping out is associated with a greater need
for such expensive social services as public assistance' 59 and unemployment assistance. 160 Compared to high school graduates, dropouts
are much more likely to be unemployed. 1 1 Even those dropouts who
are able to find work are at a distinct disadvantage in terms of earning
capacity when compared to those students who graduated from high
school and college. 162 Of course, the earning-capacity gulf widens
even further when dropouts are compared with high school graduates
who continue on to college. 163 One study has estimated that the foregone income of dropouts from the class of 1981 amounted to $228
billion and that the foregone government revenues totalled $68 billion.'6 At the same time, it has been estimated that for every dollar
spent on "early intervention and prevention... $4.74 [can be saved]
in costs of remedial education, welfare, and crime." 165 It should also
izing potential dropouts. RAY E. JONGEWARD & MAYBELLE K. CHAPMAN, DROPouTs: WASHINGTON'S WASTED RESOURCE 3 (1963). These factors are some of the same problems for

which students are often suspended or expelled. See supranotes 146-47 and accompanying
text.
157 " Terence P. Thornberry et al., The Effect of DroppingOut of Hgh School on Subsequent
Criminal Behavior, 23 CRIMINOLOGY 3, 7 (1985).
158
Id. at 15-17.
159
SMITH & LINCOLN, supranote 155, at 5.
160 Van Dougherty, Youth at Risk: The Need for Information, in CHILDREN AT RISK, supra
note 155, at 4.
161 U.S. Dep't of Lab. Bureau of Lab. Statistics, Students, Graduates, and Dropouts, October
1980-82, SPECIAL LAB. FORCE REP. 4 (Dec. 1983). In 1982, the unemployment rate for recent dropouts was 41.6%. This was 1.8 times the unemployment rate of new high school
graduates. Id.
162 SMrrH & INCOLN, supra note 155, at 2. Although the rate of dropping out has
remained relatively constant, "the mean earnings of 20- to 24-year-old male dropouts declined 41.6 percent (from $11,210 to $6,552) between 1973 and 1984." Id.
163 Id.
164
165

Id. at 5.
Id.

1996]

NOTE--EXPEILFI STUDE=TS

607

be noted that the national average cost of education per student is
only $4,422.166
The dropout problem is even greater for minority students.1 67 In
1980, the national dropout rate for white males was 16.1%.168 Yet, the
dropout rates for Blacks and Hispanics were 22.7% and 43.1%, respectively. 16 9 In the inner city, the problem is even worse. For example, in
1987, the dropout rates in New York State were 62% for Latinos, 53%
170
for Blacks, and 43% for Native Americans.
Obviously, the cost of dropping out of high school is great to the
individual student. The cost to society is even greater, both in monetary and nonmonetary terms. When the state does not provide suspended and expelled students with an alternative education, many of
the costs associated with dropping out will eventually be experienced,
because of the positive correlation between these disciplinary measures and dropping out. As the Fifth Circuit has said, "In our increasingly technological society getting at least a high school education is
almost necessary for survival. Stripping a child of access to educational opportunity is a life sentence to second-rate citizenship, unless
the child has the financial ability to migrate to another school system
71
or enter private school."'
2. DisparateTreatment of Minoity Students
As the preceding Part demonstrates, minority students are more
likely to drop out of school than white students. This fact may be
partially explained by the suspension rates for minority students.
Throughout the country, minority students are consistently suspended at much higher rates than white students. 172 In 1984, when
black students made up only 16.2% of the total national enrollment,
166
Valerie Strauss, DisparityBetween City, Suburban Schools: Almost $440 a Studen, WASH.
PosT, Sept. 28, 1994, at A20. Unfortunately, the education allocation per pupil in inner
cities is approximately $437 less than that for suburban children. Id.
As for the cost of alternative education, in Boston, for example, there are twelve alternative programs specifically designed for expelled and problem students. The cost of
these programs is approximately $5,000 per student. Hart, supra note 47, at 27.
167 One study has reported that the overall dropout rate has declined in 53% of urban
schools. However, 80% of the reporting districts acknowledged that the Black dropout
rate had increased, and 72% reported an increase in the Hispanic dropout rate. Strauss,
supra note 166, at A20.
168 Reyes, supra note 156, at 20.
169
170

Id.

Id. A 1986 study of one high school in Brooklyn, where the students are predominantly Black and Latino, found that the dropout rate was 75%. Id.
171 Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 490 F.2d 458, 460 (1974).
172
See, e.g., Graciela Sevilla, Schools Get GoodReport Card: Officials Praisedfor Their Efforts
to Improve Human Relations,WASH. PoST, Oct. 27, 1994, at M3 (praising a school for improving human relations, but noting that a disproportionate number of black students were
still being suspended).
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they accounted for 31.3% of suspensions.' 7 3 By 1988, black enrollment had increased to 21.4%, but the rate of suspension had also increased to 38.3%.174 Black high school students are suspended at a
rate of three times that of white students. 175
Much of this disparity in suspension rates can probably be explained by the discretionary aspect of suspension and expulsion rules,
176
which, as explained above, are applied by teachers and principals.
School systems are certainly not free from racism, whether intentional
or not. For example, one study found that teachers in middle-class,
predominantly white schools viewed student inattention as an indication that the teacher needed to do more to gain the student's interest.' 7 7 On the other hand, this same behavior in predominantly black,
lower-class schools was interpreted as resulting from the students' putative low attention spans. 178 When this type of disparate treatment of
black students is coupled with the discretion afforded teachers under
the suspension and expulsion rules in most states, it is not surprising
that the result is often increased suspension rates for minority
students. 179
In 1974, one court considered the disparity in suspension rates
between black and white students. In Hawkins v. Coleman,'8 0 a federal
district court in Texas examined the disproportionate impact of suspension on black students. 18 1 The court found that black students
were suspended much more frequently than white students at all
levels of public education-elementary, junior high, and senior high
school.' 8 2 It also found that black students received long-term suspensions, a more severe form of discipline, more frequently than did
white students.' 8 3 The court further noted that sixty percent of the
offenses punished by either suspension or corporal punishment were
173 Daniel & Coriell, supra note 13, at 32.
174 Id. It should also be noted that male students are suspended much more frequently than female students. In 1988, 71.6% of suspended students were male. Id.
175 Julie Underwood, Legal Protectionsfor At Risk Children, in CHIuRE AT RisK, supra
note 155, at 96.
176 See supra part IA.1.
177 Eileen McGuire, Teacher-StudentInteraction, in CHILDREN AT RIsK, supra note 155, at
177.
178 Id.
179 The discriminatory application of discretionary suspension and expulsion rules can

easily be demonstrated by one school's interpretation of a rule banning weapons. The
school interpreted the rule to include hair picks as weapons. A student found with a hair
pick could therefore be disciplined under the rule. AsJulie Underwood has pointed out,
"[t]he discriminatory impact of such an interpretation is obvious." Underwood, supra note
175, at 96.
180
376 F. Supp. 1330 (N.D. Tex. 1974).
181

Id.

182

Id. at 1335.
Id.

183
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minor, nonviolent offenses, such as truancy and talking back.'8 The
court, after hearing the testimony of expert witnesses, concluded that
the disproportionate imposition of suspension on black students was
due to institutional racism. 185 Although the court declined to outline
a specific program for the school district to follow in attempting to
eradicate the problem, it did order the district to review the present
program and to institute an affirmative program to decrease "white
institutional racism."' 8 6 More recently, other courts have reached sim87
ilar results.'
Because suspension so often influences a student's decision to
drop out of school and because the effects of dropping out are so
drastic, the fact that minority students are consistently suspended
more frequently than white students adds to the urgent need to supply these students with an educational alternative. The "underclass"
that may result from increased suspensions and expulsions will be disproportionately composed of black students, a fact that should not be
ignored. Despite new guidelines and programs, such as those initiated by the judicial branch mentioned above, the discretionary nature
of the suspension and expulsion rules, combined with the racism
found in some school systems, make it unlikely that the disproprionate suspension of black students will be completely ameliorated.
When one considers that suspension and expulsion are most often
imposed as discipline for relatively minor offenses, alternative education emerges as a much more reasonable solution to disruptive behavior than condemning students, frequently minority students, to a life
without education, which will often lead to increased criminal behavior, public assistance utilization, and unemployment.
Despite the disparate treatment of minority students under suspension and expulsion rules, it is extremely unlikely that an expelled
or suspended minority student could successfully state a claim for alternative education under the Federal Equal Protection Clause by asserting that the suspension and expulsion rules employ the suspect
classification of race. The Supreme Court has held that strict scrutiny
for race classifications will be employed only when both a discrimina184
185
186
187

Id.

Id. at 1337.
Id. at 1338.

In Ross v. Saltmarsh, 500 F. Supp. 935 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), the school district agreed to
set up committees of teachers, parents, citizens of the community, and principals from
each school in order to meet a timetable aimed at the elimination of racial disparities in
suspension rates.
An Arkansas district court found that school rules were vague and allowed too much
discretion which in turn resulted in black students being disciplined for behaviors that did
not merit discipline when observed in white students. The court ordered the development
of guidelines to remove some of this discretion. Sherpell v. Humnoke Sch. Dist. No. 5, 619
F. Supp. 670 (E.D. Ark. 1985).
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tory impact and a discriminatory purpose are demonstrated. 188 In the
area of expulsion and suspension rules, it is unlikely that a plaintiff
could prove a discriminatory purpose.
In stating a claim for alternative education under a state constitution's guarantee of a fundamental right to education, however, proof
of discriminatory impact would not be wholly irrelevant.'8 9 The discriminatory impact supports the argument that imposing suspensions
and expulsions as discipline without providing for alternative education is harmful to students; not only do suspended and expelled students tend to drop out of school at higher rates than other students
and thereby experience many setbacks, but minority students are feeling the adverse impacts of these punishments at increased rates. In
this way, proof of discriminatory impact helps to demonstrate that the
expulsion and suspension rules are not narrowly tailored enough to
the state's goal of maintaining a safe learning environment.
B.

Relying Solely on the Education Clause

It is possible that a suspended or expelled student in Washington
State or NewJersey could state a claim for alternative education under
the state constitution's education clause without resorting to an equal
protection argument. As explained above, the Washington and New
Jersey Supreme Courts, unlike most state courts, invalidated their state
school funding systems on the basis of their state constitution's education clause alone.' 9 0 However, most state courts that have invalidated
school funding systems have done so using a combination of the education clause and equal protection analysis. 19 1 There are some advantages to proceeding exclusively under the education clause rather
than a state equal protection clause. First, education has always been
governed by the state rather than the federal government. 192 Second,
because the federal Constitution does not incorporate a right to education, state courts proceeding under the state's education clause will
not feel the pressure to follow federal precedent. 193 Finally, deciding
the case under an education clause does not have as far-reaching implications as does a decision based on equal protection. 19 4 If equal
188 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERIcAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1028 (1978). It is possible
that a minority student may be able to make this claim based on discriminatory impact
under the state's equal protection provision because, as noted above, a state is free to
interpret its equal protection clause as providing more protection than its federal counter-

part. See supra part H.A.
189

See TRIBE, supranote 188, at 1030 (discussing the relevance of impact in the federal

constitutional context).
190
191
192
193
194

See supra part II.B.1.
See supra part II.B.2.
McUsic, supra note 3, at 315.
Id.
Id.
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protection is expanded to protect education, a state court may find it
difficult to determine where to draw the line as to what other sorts of
personal rights are to be protected under the state's equal protection
clauses.' 95 The NewJersey court, in fact, cited this reason specifically
when it held that education was not a fundamental right for equal
protection purposes but nonetheless invalidated the funding system
on the basis of the education clause alone. 19
Because most state courts that have invalidated state school funding schemes have done so through use of an equal protection provision, this Note focuses primarily on stating a claim for alternative
education under a state constitution's equal protection clause in conjunction with its education clause. However, it is important to note
that suspended or expelled students in Washington State and New
Jersey may be able to state a claim for alternative education without
resort to equal protection. Therefore, this Part focuses briefly on this
argument, using Washington State as an example. In Washington, a
suspended or expelled student could rely on the forceful language of
the Washington Constitution, which imposes on the state a "paramount duty... to make ample provision for the education of all children." 9 7 The Washington Supreme Court has interpreted this
language quite literally, defining "paramount" as "supreme, preeminent or dominant," and has accorded children in Washington a right
of "equal stature. "198
Washington plaintiffs challenging the state's failure to provide alternative education for suspended or expelled students would argue
that their "preeminent" or "dominant" right to education has been
violated. Of course, the state can argue that suspended or expelled
students have forfeited their right to a public education through the
behavior that led to the suspension or expulsion. In fact, the Washington Supreme Court in Seattle School Districtstated, "Since the children residing within the State's borders possess this 'right,' the State
may discharge its 'duty' only by performance unless that performance
is prevented by the holder of the 'right.'" 99 Although a suspended or
expelled student could argue that he or she did not "prevent" the
state from providing him or her with an education, this may be difficult, especially in the case of a student who is suspended for an offense of greater magnitude than some of the minor offenses which are
punishable by suspension or expulsion. For those students who are
suspended or expelled for minor offenses, such as tardiness or dress
195
196

197
198
199

Id.

Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 295-98
WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 1.

(NJ. 1973).

Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 91 (Wash. 1978).
id. at 92.
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code violations, it may be possible to argue that they have not "prevented" the state from providing them with an education. These students, and even students who have been expelled for major offenses,
could still attend alternative schools. Provided they are willing to attend such schools, they have not prevented the state from providing
them with this form of education.
In Washington, the state may assert that Ramsdell v. North River
School DistrictNo. 200o00 does not require it to provide alternative educational services. In that case, the plaintiffs wanted to change school
districts because there was some evidence, that they would receive a
better education in another district.2 0 1 The plaintiffs argued that not

allowing them to change districts violated their constitutional right to
an "ample education." 2 02 The court disagreed, finding that "disparity
among school districts" did not amount to a constitutional violation. 20 3 The court reached this conclusion because there was no evidence that the district in question was lacking in staff or facilities and
because the only evidence in the plaintiffs' favor merely suggested
that they received somewhat more intensive training at the other
school.2 04 If a suspended or expelled student were to bring an action
against the state for alternative education, the state might point to this
case to demonstrate that the right to "ample education" is not as
strong as it might appear from the Seattle School Districtholding.
Ramsdell however, can be easily distinguished from the case of a
suspended or expelled student in need of alternative education. In
Ramsdell, the plaintiffs were not deprived of education altogether. In
fact, the court found that they were receiving an education that did
not fall below minimal standards.2 0 5 In the case of a suspended or
expelled student, however, all education is withheld. Suspension or
expulsion amounts to a total deprivation of the "paramount" right to
education. It is much more than a disparity between school districts.
Because this Note argues that all suspended or expelled students
should be accorded the opportunity for alternative education, the
equal protection analysis is of greater significance. It should also be
noted that the Washington Supreme Court, unlike the New Jersey
Supreme Court, did not rule out the possibility that education would
be treated as a fundamental right under an equal protection analysis.
Therefore, the discussion of that analysis may be applicable to Wash200

201
202
203
204
205

704 P.2d 606 (Wash. 1985).
Id. at 608-09.
Id. at 609.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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ington school children as well as children in states where education
has explicitly been declared a fundamental right.
C.

Education Clauses and Equal Protection
1. Equal Protection Analysis Explained

This Part of the Note argues that, under an equal protection analysis, suspension and expulsion rules that do not provide for alternative
education must be found invalid. A plaintiff making an equal protection argument based on the fundamental status of the education right
under a state constitution will, of course, rely on the state's equal protection or equal treatment provision. 20 6 However, state courts generally interpret their equal protection provisions as requiring the same
type of analysis as that developed by the United States Supreme Court
20 7
for the Federal Equal Protection Clause.
There are two well-recognized tiers to equal protection analysis:
(1) the rational basis test and (2) the strict scrutiny test.20 8 Under the
rational basis test, a statutory classification must bear some rational
relationship to the purpose intended by the legislation.20 9 The purpose of the legislation must be predicated on an idea of the "general
good."210 Courts have been very deferential to legislatures with regard
to their decisions about what constitutes the general good.2 1 '"The
Constitution invalidates only that governmental choice which is
'clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary power, not an exercise of
2 12
judgment.'"
The analysis changes, however, when the statute either impinges
upon a fundamental right or employs a suspect classification, such as
race.2 13 In these situations, the courts employ strict scrutiny analysis.
"Legislative and administrative classifications are to be strictly scrutinized and thus held unconstitutional absent a compelling governmental justification if they distribute benefits or burdens in a manner
inconsistent with fundamental rights."2 1 4 As the United States
206 Every state constitution has some sort of clause guaranteeing equal protection of
the law. See, e.g., CONN. CONST. art. IV, § 1; IOWA CONST. art. I, § 6; MASS. CONST. art. I, § 1;
MAss. CONST. amend, art. CXIV; OHIO CONsT. art. I, § 2; VT. CONsr. ch. 1, art. I.
207 McUsic, supra note 3, at 312.
208 It should be noted that although these two levels of review are the most well-recognized, the Supreme Court has at times applied a level of review that falls somewhere between the two. Thus, the Court has applied an intermediate standard of review to
classifications based on illegitimacy and gender. TRIBE, supra note 188, at 1057, 1063.
209 McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964); see also TRIBE, supra note 188, at
995.
210 TRIBE, supra note 188, at 995.
211 Id.
212 Id. at 997 (quoting Mathews v. deCastro, 429 U.S. 181, 185 (1976)).
213 Id. at 1000.
214 Id. at 1002.
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Supreme Court has explained, under strict scrutiny analysis, the state
must show that its classification is "precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest."2 15 According to Professor Laurence
Tribe, once strict scrutiny is employed, as when a fundamental right is
at stake, it is only in the very rare case that the legislative enactment
will be upheld.2 16
Although education is not a fundamental right under the federal
Constitution 2 17 and therefore not subject to strict scrutiny analysis, a
state court invalidating a suspension or expulsion on this ground
should not be overturned for employing strict scrutiny. As explained
above, a state court is free to interpret a state constitutional provision
differently from a Supreme Court interpretation of its federal counterpart.21 8 The Supreme Court interpretation of, for example, the
Federal Equal Protection Clause merely serves as a floor for the state
court's interpretation of its own clause.2 19 Therefore, the state court
is free to provide more, although not less, protection for rights under
the state's constitution. 22 0 As the Washington State Supreme Court
explained in Darrinv. Gould:
[T]he state's version of the Equal Protection Clause[ ] has been
construed in a manner similar to that of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Such construction, however, is not automatically compelled. [The state version] may be
construed to provide greater protection to individual rights than
22 1
that provided by the Equal Protection Clause.
Because of this power, a state court could conceivably hold that the
state equal protection provision protects the state right to education
in the suspension or expulsion situation even when that right has not
been declared fundamental.
2.

Equal ProtectionAnalysis of a Right to Education

This Part of the Note argues that suspensions or expulsions without provision for alternative education are unconstitutional under
equal protection analysis in states where education is a fundamental
right under the state constitution.

215
216
217
218
219
220
221

Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-17 (1982).
TRIBE, supra note 188, at 1000.
San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 30 (1973).
ADVISORY COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 12.
Id.
Id.
540 P.2d 882 (1975) (internal citations omitted).
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a. In General
As explained above, many state courts have held that the state
constitution's education clause incorporates a fundamental right to
education.2 2 2 Therefore, in those states, any infringement on the
right to education should require a strict scrutiny equal protection
analysis.2 23 Under such an analysis, the imposition of suspension or
expulsion without making provision for alternative education violates
the state constitution. As explained above, when the state infringes
upon a fundamental right, it must demonstrate that there is a compelling government interest behind that infringement and that the classification is "precisely tailored" to serve that interest.2 24 In some
expulsion or long-term suspension cases, at least in those cases in
which the offense is not minor, the state may be able to point to a
compelling government interest, such as maintaining safety and peace
in the schools. However, an expulsion or long-term suspension without provision for alternative education will rarely, if ever, be "precisely
tailored" to serve that end. The school may have a legitimate, even
compelling, reason for excluding a student from school. However, a
student's fundamental right to education can be more thoroughly
and precisely protected, and the state's interest can be preserved,
without resort to suspension or expulsion without alternative education. A student in a state where education is a fundamental right can
argue that the state is required to provide alternative education under
the state constitution, because the suspension or expulsion of a student from public school implicates a fundamental right. Providing
educational services to suspended or expelled students is a more precisely tailored means of attaining the state's goals and should therefore be required under a strict scrutiny analysis.
This deprivation of a constitutional right without employing
means narrowly tailored to attain a compelling state interest amounts
to a denial of not only the substantive fundamental right to education
but also the equal protection of the laws. Children who are not sus222
See supra part lI.B.2; see, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 951 (Cal. 1976)
("[E]ducation is a fundamental interest."); Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359, 373 (Conn.
1977) ("[In Connecticut the right to education is so basic and fundamental that any infringement of that right must be strictly scrutinized."); Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 313
(Minn. 1993) ("[We hold that education is a fundamental right under the state constitution."); School Dist. of Wilkinsburg v. Wilkinsburg Educ. Ass'n, 667 A.2d 5, 9 (Pa. 1995)
("[P]ublic education in Pennsylvania is a fundamental right."); Scott v. Commonwealth of
Virginia, 443 S.E.2d 138, 142 (Va. 1994) ("[E]ducation is a fundamental right under the
[Virginia] Constitution."); Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310,
333 (Wyo.) ("In the light of the emphasis which the Wyoming Constitution places on education, there is no room for any conclusion but that education for the children of Wyoming is a matter of fundamental interest."), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980).
223 See supra part ll.B.2.
224 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-17 (1982).
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pended or expelled continue to receive education services. This sort
of classification would almost certainly withstand a rational basis inquiry. However, under the strict scrutiny construction of the equal
protection clause required when a fundamental right is implicated,
the classification fails because it is not "precisely tailored" to the state's
legitimate interest in peace in the schools. By providing suspended
and expelled students with an opportunity for alternative education,
the state attains its goal of maintaining peace in the public schools
and avoids impinging drastically on the students' fundamental right
to education.
b. Litigation of the Suspension-Expulsion Question
Very few plaintiffs have litigated the validity of a suspension or
expulsion under an equal protection analysis of the fundamental right
to education. However, there are a few cases that have addressed the
issue either directly or indirectly.
In Doe v. Superintendent of Schools, 225 the plaintiff had been expelled from public school without provision for alternative education
for bringing what she considered to be a gag knife to school. 226 She
challenged her expulsion on several grounds. 227 Most importantly,
228
she asserted that McDuffy v. Secretary of Executive Office of Education
had held that students in Massachusetts had a fundamental right to
education and that therefore her expulsion was not "the least restrictive alternative" required under strict scrutiny analysis because the
school authorities could have either suspended her or provided her
with alternative education. 229 The court, however, insisted that
McDuffy did not provide a fundamental right to education and therefore applied a rational basis level of review to find that the plaintiff's
25 0
constitutional rights had not been infringed.
Although Doe squarely confronts a claim for alternative education
under a state constitution's education clause, the case will not be con225 653 N.E.2d 1088 (Mass. 1995).
226 Id. at 1091. The knife had a one-and-one-quarter-inch blade with a sharp point but
dull cutting edge. The blade was hidden in a lipstick case which twisted open. Id.
227 The plaintiff asserted that "school officials abused their discretion, acted outside
their statutory authority, and violated her fundamental, constitutionally protected interest
in a public education." Id. at 1092.
228 615 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1993). For a brief discussion of McDuffy, see supra notes
139-41 and accompanying text.
229 653 N.E.2d at 1095.
230 Id. at 1097. The court stated:
Under the minimal scrutiny of the rational basis test, the flact that a less
onerous alternative exists is irrelevant. Thus, since her expulsion was rationally related to the maintenance of order in the school, the defendants'
decision not to provide the plaintiff with an alternate education does not
render her expulsion unconstitutional.
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trolling or even persuasive authority in many states. The question
whether the Massachusetts Constitution provided a fundamental right
to education had been left open by earlier opinions, and therefore
the court in Doe was able to hold that there was no such fundamental
right and thereby apply the rational basis level of review. As this Note
has explained, in those states where education has been declared a
fundamental right, suspended or expelled students will be much
more likely to succeed in their demands for alternative education, be23
cause the burden on the state will be much higher. '
At least one court has held that a fundamental right exists in the
course of striking down a challenged suspension. In ClintonMunicipal
Separate School District v. Byrd,23 2 two high school students challenged
their suspensions on the ground that their fundamental right to education had been violated. The Mississippi Supreme Court held that
there was a fundamental right to "a minimally adequate public education," seemingly basing this determination on the statutory laws of the
state which provided for education for all of the children of the
state.23 3 However, the court denied the plaintiffs' claim on the
ground that the punishment "further[ed] a substantial legitimate in2
terest of the school district." 3
Although this case would appear to deny the possibility that suspended or expelled students in Mississippi could successfully state a
claim for alternative education, it should not be very persuasive authority in other states. First, the court appeared to rely on legislation,
rather than on a constitutional education clause, for its determination
that a fundamental right to education exists. Second, perhaps because it was not relying on an education clause, the court was able to
determine that the school district was entitled to great deference in its
disciplinary decisions, despite an infringement on the students' right
to education. Finally, the court merely required that the school district demonstrate that its action "further[ed] a substantial legitimate
interest." As explained above, the strict scrutiny employed when a

231
In states where the courts have not yet determined whether the state constitution
provides a fundamental right to education, suspended or expelled students may find it
more difficult to state a claim for alternative education. Presumably, those courts will be
free to take the Doe approach: hold that no such fundamental right to education exists and
then apply the rational basis level of review to find that the suspension or expulsion was
rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Plaintiffs in these states will have to argue
(1) that there is in fact a fundamental right to education in their state that must be recognized and (2) that the fundamental right requires that they be afforded some form of
alternative education.
232 477 So. 2d 287 (Miss. 1985).
233 Id. at 240.
234 Id.
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fundamental right is at stake places a much greater burden on the
35
state.2
Any state challenged to provide alternative education to suspended or expelled students may cite In reJackson,23 6 from North Carolina, as support for denial of the claim. In that case, the plaintiff was
suspended, after being afforded the proper procedural safeguards, for
assaulting a teacher and another student.25 7 The juvenile court judge
had ordered that the plaintiff either be reinstated in public school or
be provided with an alternative forum for education. The judge relied on state statutes allowing ajuvenile court judge to place a delinquent juvenile on probation and required as a part of that probation
that he attend school. 23 8 The North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the statute on which the juvenile court judge relied conflicted with another statute allowing suspensions. 23 9 The
court stated that when the school has not provided an alternative forum for education, the juvenile court judge may not order public
school attendance. 240 The court also considered the constitutional issue and found that the student's light to an education could be denied when outweighed by a school's interest in protecting other
students, teachers, and school property. According to the court, suspensions do not deny the right to education but instead deny the
right to participate in prohibited behavior.2 4 1 Therefore, the court
found that the public schools do not have a duty to provide suspended
students with an alternative education. 242
Many states might consider this opinion persuasive authority for
denying a right to alternative education for suspended or expelled
students. However, as explained above, North Carolina has not recognized a fundamental right to education, but merely a right to equal
access to education. 243 This equal-access right is very different from
the fundamental right other courts have recognized. In North Carolina, the right to equal access is apparently protected if all students
will be suspended or expelled for the same violations because all stu235 See, e.g., Skeen v. Minnesota, 505 N.W.2d 299, 312 (Minn. 1993) (Under strict scrutiny analysis, the state would "have to prove that the statute is necessay to a compellinggovernment interest.") (emphasis added); Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Herschler, 606
P.2d 310, 333 (Wyo.) (Under strict scrutiny, the state must "establish that there is no ess
onerous alternativeby which its objective may be achieved.") (emphasis added), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 824 (1980).
236 352 S.E.2d 449 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987).
237 Id. at 451.
238 Id. at 453.
239 Id. at 454.
240 Id.
241

Id. at 455.

242
243

Id.

See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
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dents will have the same opportunity for education which they can all
lose for the same reasons. However, in a state where education itself is
a fundamental right, equality in suspensions and expulsions is not
enough. It cannot be said that the state is not required to provide
alternative education merely because it does not currently do so, as
the court in Jackson held. When students have a fight to education,
there is a greater protection for suspended or expelled students than
when the students merely hold a fight to equal access to the education
that is currently offered by the state.
The Washington Supreme Court has also considered the suspension-expulsion question, but in a different context. In Tommy P. v.
Board of County Commissioners,244 the Washington Supreme Court
found that juveniles in detention facilities have a fight to education.
The court did not rest this decision on the Washington Constitution
but instead on the state's mandatory attendance laws 245 and the Juvenile Justice Act. 246 The court held that because juveniles in detention

facilities were not expressly exempted from the mandatory attendance
law and because education would further the goals of the Juvenile Justice Act, these laws required that they be provided with educational
247
services.
Although the case did not confront the equal protection issue, it
may be helpful precedent for a student challenging his or her suspension or expulsion on equal protection grounds. It is difficult to see
how denying educational services to suspended or expelled students
while providing them for juvenile detainees can withstand even a rational basis scrutiny under equal protection analysis. If the state is
required to provide juvenile detainees with educational services, there
is no rational reason why it should not be similarly required to provide
suspended and expelled students with an education. The fact that the
behavior of suspended or expelled students has not reached the level
at which the students become juvenile detainees is no reason to deny
them at least the advantages of education with which juvenile detainees are provided. Under a strict scrutiny analysis, the classification
surely fails because the policy of not providing educational services to
expelled students is not precisely tailored to serve the state interest of
maintaining a safe school environment. When the requirement of
244

645 P.2d 697 (Wash. 1982).

WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 28A.27.010, .01.060 (West 1982).
246 WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 13.40.010-.450 (West 1993 & Supp. 1994).
247
645 P.2d at 704. This holding also refutes any use ofJacksonby Washington State to
attempt to defeat a claim for alternative education by suspended or expelled students. The
court in Jackson had stated that because there was not currently a system of alternative
education in existence, the courts could not force the state to provide one. In Tommy P.,
no system of education was in place forjuvenile detainees, but the court required that the
state provide one nonetheless. Id.
245
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providing juvenile detainees with education is considered together
with the general equal protection analysis discussed above, it becomes
clear that the classification is not precisely tailored to serve the state
purpose. The fact that the state is able to provide these detainees with
educational services helps to demonstrate that the burden of providing alternative education in Washington State at least is not so great as
to justify infringement of the fundamental right to education.
Although the irrational distinction between juvenile detainees
and suspended and expelled students may be of limited use to plaintiffs in states other than Washington, the next Part offers an example
of another classification that should not withstand strict scrutiny analysis in any state.
c.

Expulsion-Suspension and Disabled Students

Another classification that further strengthens the argument for
providing suspended and expelled students with educational services
involves disabled students. In Honig v. Doe,248 the United States
Supreme Court held that the Education for the Handicapped Act
(EHA) requires that schools not unilaterally exclude disabled students
beyond a temporary ten-day suspension. 249 Although the opinion did
not expressly state that disabled students must be provided with educational services regardless of suspension or expulsion, this has been
2 50
the holding of other courts.
In 1981, the Fifth Circuit, in S-1 v. Turlington,25 1 held that even
when the behavior leading to the expulsion does not stem from the
student's disability, the student cannot be denied all educational services, although he or she may be excluded from the school.2 5 2 Similarly, in 1993, the Office of Special Education Programs issued a
response to an inquiry, stating that Part B of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) (the current version of the EHA) requires that when misconduct is determined not to be a manifestation
of the student's disability, the student may be removed from school,
but educational services may not be stopped even if the disciplinary
removal is to exceed ten school days.255 Therefore, children with disabilities may not be denied free appropriate public education even
248

484 U.S. 305 (1988).

249

Id. at 323-24.

250

See Sue G. Simon, Disciplinein the PublicSchools: A Dual Standardfor Handicappedand

NonhandicappedStudents , 13J. L. & EDUc. 209 (1984).
251 635 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1981).
252 Id. at 348.
253 20 IDELR 625 (1993).
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when they are legitimately excluded from the public schools for be25 4
havior unrelated to their disabilities.
Students without disabilities, however, are routinely denied edu-

cational services during expulsions and long-term suspensions. When
a fundamental right is implicated, classifying on the basis of disability

when the behavior of disabled students is unrelated to their disability
cannot survive a strict scrutiny analysis.2 55 Where education has been
declared a fundamental right, an expelled or suspended student can
point to this classification as not being precisely tailored to meet the
state's interest. When a fundamental right is at stake, any classification must survive strict scrutiny analysis. In fact, there hardly seems to
be a rational basis for providing disabled students with educational
services when they are suspended or expelled for behavior found to
be unrelated to their disability while denying this same advantage to
nondisabled students. Of course, the disabled student's right to educational services is based on a legislative act, the IDEA; however, this
legislative distinction cannot withstand equal protection analysis in a
state where education is a fundamental right of all children residing
in the state, not merely disabled students.
CONCLUSION

Public school students in America are being suspended and expelled at increasing rates. Few districts provide for alternative forms
of education for these children. Thus, a large group of this country's
young people are missing portions of their education, and many eventually drop out altogether. The future of dropouts is not bright. They
are often unemployed or earning less than their peers, and some
eventually turn to crime.
Suspended or expelled students may be able to end this destructive pattern. Although it is unlikely that a suspended or expelled student could state a constitutional claim for alternative education under
254 Recently, the Clinton administration attempted to withhold $50 million in education funds from Virginia because the state wished to expel disabled students when the
behavior for which the student was being expelled was unrelated to her or his disability.
However, a court of appeals recently ruled that the federal government could not withhold
the funds. Steve Bates, U.S. Cannot Withhold Virginia School Funds: Court Rules in Dispute
Over Policy on Expelling Disabled Students, WAsH. Posr, Apr. 30, 1994, at B5.
255 This Note does not argue that disabled students should be denied the educational
benefits that these cases and statutes provide. However, it is inappropriate to continue to
deny alternative education to some students merely because they do not suffer from a
disability while at the same time providing alternative education to disabled students who
are removed from school for behavior completely unrelated to their disability. Rather,
both groups of students should be given the opportunity to receive alternative educational
services. The fact that courts have construed the IDEA to require alternative services for
disabled students, even when the disciplined behavior is not a result of their disability,
indicates that states are able to provide such services. The provision of such services should
merely be extended to nondisabled students.
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the federal Constitution, many state constitutions provide students
with a right to education. In states where courts have determined that
the state constitution's education clause affords a fundamental right,
students may assert that suspension or expulsion without provision for
alternative education cannot survive a strict scrutiny equal protection
analysis. 256 Although the state may have a legitimate interest in maintaining peace in the public schools, the large infringement on the fundamental right to education brought about by suspensions and
expulsions is not narrowly tailored enough to survive strict scrutiny
analysis. By providing alternative education for suspended and expelled students, the state can achieve its goal and place a much less
onerous burden on the students' fundamental right.
Roni R. Reed

256
Even in states where courts have not found the state constitution to embody a fundamentalright to education, students may have an equal protection claim. If a state constitution's education clause has been found to afford some enforceable right to education, it
is possible that a state court, in interpreting the state's equal protection provision, may
accord this right greater protection than would the federal courts under the federal
Constitution.
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